How to blunt special interest money corruption? Fight fire with hotter fire.

Lobbyists currently spend about $3.5 billion per year trying to influence congress. In response, members of congress spend a lot of time with lobbyists, 25-50% by one estimate. There are about 13,000 registered lobbyists and 535 voting members of congress, a ratio of about 24:1. Logic and common sense says that people who hire lobbyists and make campaign contributions do it on that scale because it is effective. Common sense argues that the money would not be there if it was ineffective. Otherwise, businesses being efficient and not stupid, would not waste money and would simply try to persuade congress by arguing their case on the merits and not waste the cash.

What is a reasonable conclusion? Special interest money buys some, many or most people in congress and that's the incentive to pay incumbents in the first place. Of course, everyone involved usually (i) denies that money buys anything other than innocent "access" to congress and (ii) whatever goes on is 100% in the public interest. Special interests include (i) private and public sector campaign contributors and their lobbyists, (ii) members of congress and (iii) both political parties. On occasion, a player does come clean and admit that the money game is something other than pure innocence. Those folks are usually (but not always*) retired or not running for re-election. They have nothing to lose in their quest to burnish their public record for posterity.

* This exception to the rule is revealing. Search for "lobby" in the transcript and scan the text associated with the hits. The situation can't get any clearer without the people involved going to jail for admitting to felonies.

So, can anything be done about it? Probably. Consider the following two scenarios.

  USS Ronald Reagan 

Near Hawaii - July 2010

Scenario 1 - Politics as usual: Powerful senator X is at a high powered cocktail party in Georgetown with many high powered lobbyists. Loads of power are everywhere. Those are folks loaded with cash to contribute to the senator's re-election campaign through "gentle" persuasion, or if things don't go well, the senator's challenger in the next election. The senator really wants to be re-elected and doesn't want that cash going to whoever X's next opponent. The senator's interest is piqued and he/she sets up an appointment with the lobbyist and the two speak off the record behind closed doors. A law is altered somehow and the lobbyist got what he/she wanted.

What happened was off the record and behind closed doors. But if on the outside chance the senator is caught red-handed fudging the law and is publicly called on it, senator X will argue it was in the public interest. And, if there is enough at stake and it is necessary, the special interest will pay millions or tens of millions in media buys to convince us. That's politics as usual. What is the net effect of that kind of political business as usual on the public interest over time? Good, bad or indifferent?

U.S. Cruise missile launch - operation Odyssey Dawn

defending Libyan civilians - March 2011

Scenario 2 - Politics not as usual: The same scenario as above, e.g., senator X is at a high powered cocktail party in Georgetown with high powered lobbyists loaded with cash to help the senator's re-election campaign or the senator's challenger in the next election. But in this hypothetical scenario, there is a difference. Here, if senator X takes lobbyist money his top one or two bona fide challengers in the next election gets three (or two or whatever is needed) dollars for every dollar that the senator takes from any special interest while in office, including his own political party. But if the incumbent takes no special interest money, he/she and their bona fide opponents all get the same in the next election. Everyone is on the same financial footing.

Vicious public financing

In that not politics as usual scenario senator's thoughts might be: "Geez, wait a minute. If I take $400,000 from lobbyist Z, my opponent will have $1.2 million with which to distort my record and smear my good name - I would have only $400,000 in comparable smear power. I might even lose the next election - I live in a God-awful purple state. On the other hand, I could just (i) listen to what Z has to say, not take his money, and then decide if acting on his request is in my best interest, er, um, no wait, the public interest, or not or (ii) ignore Z because he obviously has nothing of real importance to ask for - there is no political risk (no harm to the public and thus no avenue of attack against me in the next election ) in just blowing him off." In this scenario the politician has to consider the public interest. There is no financial incentive favoring the special interest unless the two interests more or less overlap, e.g., win-win scenarios, which is just fine (preferred, actually) whenever they arise.

  Air dropped supplies for Company D, 1st Battalion 

4th Infantry Regiment over Forward Operating Base Baylough, 

Zabul province, Afghanistan - June 2010

What is the net effect of that kind of political business not as usual on the public interest over time? Good, bad or indifferent? What if every special interest knew that there was no way they could ever provide any incumbent or challenger with anything but a financial disadvantage regardless of how much they spent? Would it blunt the power of special interest money to buy people in congress without compelling arguments? It should.

Logically speaking, outspending special interests should at least partly neuter the special interest incentive to buy the senator and/or get the politician to be more attentive to public service. There is no reason to believe it would not work in that manner. This is just a matter of aligning capitalist incentives to favor the public interest.